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Determinants of internal governance quality:
Evidence from corporations in Ethiopia
Yrgalem Gebreslassie Adane1, Tadesse Getacher Engida2, Yitbarek Abrha Asfaw1,
Hossein Azadi3,4* and Steven Van Passel4,5
Abstract: The study analysed the factors that affect the internal governance quality
of corporations in Ethiopia. It performed an ordered logistic regression analysis on a
randomly selected sample of 76 corporations to analyse the effect of the ownership
structure, form of ownership (private or government), leverage, corporate size, and
sales growth on the internal governance quality score (IGQS). The governance
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quality score was measured using 20 indices categorized into four perspectives:
disclosure, board characteristics, ethics, and shareholder rights. In this study, a
significant positive effect of the corporate size and sales growth on the IGQS was
found. In addition, government-owned corporations were found to perform better
than privately owned corporations. It is recommended that appropriate authorities
and officials should encourage the use of the corporate governance system in
privately owned corporations and the convergence of internal governance quality of
the two groups of corporations to the highest level.
Subjects: Government; Politics & Development; Development Policy
Keywords: corporation; ownership structure; governance; management; development
policy
1. Introduction
The corporate business form has no long history and tradition in Ethiopian business. However, over
the past two decades, this business form has been emerging in the nation’s business environment.
The presence of an ambitious growth and transformation plan (GTP), the development of diversi-
fied sources of energy projects, cheap labour, and land, and the potential market have all created
fertile ground for corporations to flourish in the country (Figure 1).
Corporations, one of the three business forms, are characterized as legal entities that result
in the separation of the capital provider (shareholders) and the management (agent). In
publicly held companies, stockholders are separated from the control of the corporation and
the control is transferred to the hands of managers. The separation of ownership and control
creates a kind of principal–agent relationship between shareholders and managers (Reeve et
al., 1999; Frank & Sergeja, 2007). The modern organization of industrial companies was an
automatic response to technological, and its first step was the enlargement of firms which was
suggested by Chandler (1997). According to him, large companies required vertical integration
to minimize costs and dependence on other companies. Chandler believes that traditionally
joint stock corporations are seen as indispensable to rapid economic progress because they
foster capital pooling, risk sharing and governance, but recent research has shown that when
alternative forms were available in history, specifically the private limited liability company, the
joint-stock form was adopted much less frequently.
Figure 1. Government and pri-
vately owned corporations
(Source: The study findings).
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In a situation in which capital is invested by one party and managed by another, the manager
cannot be expected to watch over the investment with the same anxious vigilance as investors do.
This may result in the agency problem, which is the risk of the managers working for their own
interest at the expense of the shareholders’ interest. Therefore, to avoid undesirable risk concern-
ing managers, there should be an internal and external legal framework through which the
operations of a corporation and its decision patterns can be governed. A well-governed corporation
needs to balance the roles of shareholders, managers, and the board of directors (BOD) at the
same time as meeting all its obligations to a broad array of stakeholders. The potential problems
linked with the separation of ownership and control paved the way for the field of corporate
governance to emerge (Denis, 2001).
Corporate governance has an effect on corporations’ financing and investment pattern, and this
in turn influences their pace and direction of prosperity. Effective corporate governance promotes
the efficient use of resources within both the firm and the wider economy (Klapper, 2004; Stijn &
Burcin, 2012). On the other hand, poor corporate governance facilitates the collapse of a corpora-
tion. Though there is no evidence to show that weak corporate governance can cause a financial
crisis, studies in East Asia have proved that weak corporate governance can aggravate an already-
occurring crisis, such as the East Asian financial crisis of 1997 to 1998, to its worst level (Cliffe,
2002; Driscoll & Evans, 2005; Weiss, 2008).
To ensure good corporate governance, it is necessary to establish well-defined rules and
regulations, and these call for appropriate government officials and policy makers. In addition to
the legal framework, there are some factors, in fact with legal ground, within a corporation that
can exert an impact on corporate governance. Such factors include the ownership structure,
leverage, firm size, firm age, proportion of independent non-executive directors on the board,
audit committee (AC), family members on the board, assets-in-place, compensation contracts,
profitability, and industry type (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002).
Various authors and researchers have dealt with the quality of corporate governance from
different perspectives. Ho and Wong (2001) examined the composition of the BOD, the existence
of an AC, the existence of dominant personalities, and the proportion of family members on the
board in Hong Kong–listed companies to deal with this issue. Brown and Caylor (2006) identified
seven internal and external governance measures as drivers of corporate governance: board
members are elected annually; the company either has no poison pill or has one approved by
shareholders; option repricing has not occurred within the last 3 years; the average options
granted in the past 3 years as a percentage of the basic shares outstanding have not exceeded
3 per cent; all the directors have attended at least 75 per cent of the board meetings or had a valid
excuse for non-attendance; the board guidelines are in each proxy statement; and the directors
are subject to stock ownership guidelines.
The main objective of this study is to analyse the factors that determine the internal governance
quality of corporations in Ethiopia. More specifically, this paper aims:
(1) To examine whether the ownership structure is a determinant factor of the internal govern-
ance quality.
(2) To find out whether and to what extent the dimensions of the internal governance quality
differ in private and government ownership.
(3) To analyse the effect of the corporation size on internal governance.
(4) To investigate the impact of capital structure corporations on the internal governance
quality.
(5) To analyse the effect of sales growth on the internal corporate governance quality.
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The paper is divided into five sections. Section 2 introduces literature works of different scholars
and authors on the determining factors that affect the quality of internal governance. Section 3
discusses the research methodology and the data that were employed in this study. Section 4
contains the results and a discussion. The final section summarizes the main findings of the paper
and states their implications for policy.
2. Literature review
This section reviews the literature works of different scholars and authors on the determining
factors that affect the quality of internal governance in the corporate form of business.
2.1. Definitions of corporate governance
Owing to their contribution to economic development, corporations are the most crucial form
of business organization. They can pool financial and non-financial resources from various
investors; they can, due to economies of scale, operate effectively and efficiently; and they
can serve the market better by increasing the supply or decreasing the price. Hence, corpora-
tions are owned by a very great number of investors, called shareholders. According to Article
307 (1) of the Ethiopian commercial code (CCE), a corporation is established by not fewer than
five members (Asnakech, 2012; Gebeyaw, 2012).
Widely spread ownership, especially in large corporations, entails the separation of ownership
and control (Ros & Terry, 2000). As cited by Denis (2001), Adam Smith, in his Wealth of Nations,
stated that because a corporation’s resources are provided by stockholders and controlled by
managers, managers cannot be expected to watch over the corporation with the same anxious
vigilance.
Corporate governance entails the development of monitoring and evaluation systems to
shape the management’s finance and investment decision behaviour and ensure that the
management behaves in the best interests of the shareholders (Lawrence & Marcus, 2006).
Corporate governance has been defined differently by different scholars. Rezaee (2009, pp.
306–307) defined it as “an ongoing process of managing, controlling, and assessing business
affairs to create shareholder value and protect the interests of other stakeholders.” Moreover,
the author pinpointed seven essential functions of corporate governance: oversight, manage-
rial, compliance, internal audit, advisory, external audit, and monitoring. It is a means to
delineate effectively the rights and responsibilities of each group of stakeholders in the com-
pany (Denis, 2001; Ho and Wong, 2001). On the other hand, corporate governance refers to the
set of mechanisms that influence the decisions made by managers when ownership and
control are separated (Larcker, Richardson, & Tuna, 2007; Eloisa, 2016). Corporate governance
is a broad concept, and it encompasses internal factors (internal corporate governance
mechanisms) and external factors (such as the legal framework and legal institutions).
2.1.1. Function and determinants of corporate governance
Many papers have dealt with the function and the determinants of corporate governance. This
section reviews the main determining factors affecting the internal governance quality of
corporations.
Controlling shareholders have a negative effect on the corporate governance of their firms. The
empirical results show that the internal corporate governance mechanism as a monitoring tool
may not work due to resisting controlling shareholders. In this sense, the controlling shareholders
of a firm with a concentrated ownership structure are harder to monitor or check for misbehaviour
than professional managers. Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) claimed that the involvement of the
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) influences the selection of new directors when the ownership dis-
tribution of the firm is dispersed and when he or she is the controlling shareholder in concentrated
ownership structures (Sang-Woo & Chong, 2004; Coram et al., 2008; Rainsbury et al., 2008).
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2.1.2. Normative categorizations
Since the last decade, the number of corporate business organizations has been increasing at a
remarkable rate in Ethiopia. Thus, the concept of corporate governance has just recently emerged
following the introduction of corporations. All the large-scale business organizations in Ethiopia
can be classified into three types: those established by issuing stock to the public, private limited
companies, and endowments. In the Commercial Code of Ethiopia (CCE) Art. 304:1, a corporation,
also referred to as a share company, is defined as a company of which the capital is fixed in
advance and divided into shares and of which the liabilities are met only by the assets of the
company.
Any Ethiopian corporation is required by law to appoint one or more auditors and one or more
assistant auditors elected at a general meeting. They are responsible for auditing records and
securities; verifying the validity and reliability of records and financial reports; certifying that the
reports of the BOD reflect the correct state of the company’s affairs; and carrying out special audits
given by the management (CCE Art 368:1 and 374). Hence, the appointment of auditors is a legal
mechanism to strengthen the internal corporate governance in Ethiopia (Hussein, 2012). The CCE
contains some restrictions on the appointment of auditors to avoid possible conflicts of interest;
however, it says nothing about their composition and the frequency of their meetings.
Since corporations are a recent phenomenon in Ethiopia, the literature related to the subject is
limited. However, the Ethiopian Institute of Corporate Governance, which was established on 26
October 2013, is responsible for controlling the ethics and conduct of companies in the country.
2.2. Justifications for the approach in this study
In this study, we considered and adopted the corporate governance quality indicators used by
Silveira et al. (2004) and Frank and Sundgren (2012). Frank and Sundgren examined the existence
of an AC, the financial expertise within the AC, the frequency of AC meetings per year, internal
audit functions, risk management functions, the code of conduct, and whistle-blower provisions to
analyse the corporate governance quality in Sweden. The existence of an AC is the first indicator
considered. The AC plays an important role in enhancing good internal corporate governance by
influencing the top management’s thoughts regarding internal control and other core activities.
In addition, we referred to Toledo’s governance index (GOV-I) to assess good governance
practices in Spain. The GOV-I is composed of four dimensions (and 25 sub-indices) created as a
proxy for the quality of governance in the sample companies. The four dimensions are (1) access to
and content of the information; (2) the structure of the board; (3) the ownership structure and
control; and (4) progressive practices. We examined those dimensions and the questions com-
pounding the index. We observed that those two main references (Silveira et al., 2007; Frank &
Sundgren, 2012) share empirically supported internal governance indicators, which helped us to
measure the governance scores of our sample corporations.
3. Materials and methods
This study was designed to investigate the factors affecting the internal governance quality of
corporations in Ethiopia. This section discusses the research methodology of the study in more
detail. The formal hypotheses addressed in this study are the following:
H1: There is a direct association between diffused ownership and internal governance quality.
H2: There is no difference between private or governmental ownership in internal governance
quality.
H3: There is a positive association between firm size and internal governance quality.
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H4: There is a positive association between leverage and internal governance quality.
H5: There is a positive association between a firm’s sales growth and its internal governance
quality.
3.1. Description of the study area and sample
The target population for this study was the different corporations in Ethiopia. Hence, our research
utilized data that were collected from the head offices of the corporations, mainly located in Addis
Ababa.
3.2. Sample and data type
A sample of 76 companies was chosen randomly, comprising sectors including manufacturing,
services (excepting banks), and trade. Our study used both archival data and survey data. To test
the proposed research hypotheses, we conducted a survey among the corporations in Ethiopia in
2014. The survey method is appropriate for studies, such as the present one, that seek cross-
sectional variation and association. Secondary information was gathered from publicly available
annual accounts of the corporations, and variables such as total assets, total debts, and total
revenues were found in the profit and loss statements and the balance sheets of the same.
To select the survey respondents, we approached the corporations at the board level. Besides,
with the help of the human resource managers, respondents in each company were selected
based on their familiarity with the theme of our study (functional areas where they work).
3.3. Data and methodology
The collected data were analysed using (1) descriptive statistical tools such as a measure of central
tendency and a measure of dispersion and (2) ordered logistic regression. The ordered logistic
regression model is used to identify the factors that affect internal corporate governance and to
determine the direction of their effect (Murad, Fleischman, Sadetzki, Geyer, & Freedman, 2003).
3.4. Operationalization of internal governance quality score (IGQS)
In this study we used an ordinal scale, the IGQS, which takes higher values if a company has taken
certain actions that might improve the internal governance quality. The measure is based on the
Ethiopian corporate governance framework and the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the
Treadway Commission (COSO) guidelines for IC, as well as prior studies.
Gauging the quality of corporate governance is subjective and can be controversial. Analysts are
unlikely to agree on whether or not a certain aspect of corporate governance should be included,
how much weight should be given to each aspect, and what scores should be given to responses to
individual questions (Nam & Nam, 2004). However, we tried to address the problem of subjectivity
in this study by incorporating many questions on various elements of corporate governance
characteristics and aggregating the scores based on those numerous questions.
This paper assessed the internal governance quality of selected Ethiopian corporations, which
were chosen randomly, based on indicators with a relevant relationship to internal governance
as used by Frank and Sundgren (2012). These authors identified an indicator variable that could
measure the internal governance quality of Swedish corporations, including whether a company
has an AC, a sufficient number of AC meetings during the year, financial expertise on the AC, an
internal auditing function, a risk management function, a provision for whistle-blowing, and a
code of conduct. Our methodology is in line with the study by Frank and Sundgren (2012),
although we did not consider the whistle-blowing provision variable in our case, as there is little
empirical evidence of the implementation of the protection in Ethiopia. In addition, we referred
to Silveira et al. (2007), who used corporate GOV-Is to measure firm-level governance quality in
Brazil. We also adopted Toledo’s (n.d.) GOV-I, used to assess good governance practices in
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Spain. The GOV-I is composed of four dimensions (25 sub-indices) created as a proxy for the
quality of governance in the sample companies. The four dimensions are (1) access to and
content of the information; (2) the structure of the board; (3) the ownership structure and
control; and (4) progressive practices. We examined those dimensions and the questions
compounding the index and selected many of the questions included in the first three
dimensions.
Generally, although the use of the corporate governance code in Ethiopia is quite new in
comparison with developed nations, where the use of a nation-wide code of corporate governance
has a long tradition, we believe that our variables revealed the local context well and measured
the governance quality of the Ethiopian corporations considered in the study.
Based on the above discussion, we now specify the IGQS for this study. We use the IGQS as an
indicator variable taking values between 0 and 20 depending on how many of the following criteria
are met in the sample firms.
IGQS = DISCLOSURE + BOARD + ETHICS + RIGHTS
DISCLOSURE ‒ This dimension includes four corporate GOV-Is related to access to information in
the firm: (1) whether the company produces its legally required financial reports by the required
date; (2) whether the company discloses enough information or analysts’ presentations with which
any investor can make projections for the company; (3) whether the company discloses on its
website or in its annual report compensation information for the CEO and board members; and
(4) whether the company specifies in its charter, annual reports, or other means sanctions against
the management in the case of violations of its desired corporate governance practices.
BOARD ‒ This dimension includes seven board composition and functioning indexes in the firm:
(1) whether the Chairman of the Board and the CEO are different persons (no CEO duality);
(2) whether the company has monitoring committees, such as a compensation and/or nomination
and/or AC; (3) whether the board is clearly made up of outside and possibly independent directors;
(4) whether there are frequent AC meetings during the fiscal year (the AC meets at least twice a
year); (5) whether there is financial expertise within the AC (accountant, auditor, financial officer);
(6) whether internal audit functions (in-house or external) are present in the company; and
(7) whether there are risk management functions in the company.
ETHICS ‒ This dimension includes three indexes with respect to ethics and conflicts of interest in
the firm: (1) whether the company submits to arbitration in place of regular legal procedures in the
case of corporate governance malpractices; (2) whether executive and non-executive directors’
percentage of beneficial shares exceeds 5 per cent; and (3) whether there are ethical guidelines or
a code of conduct in the company.
RIGHTS ‒ This dimension includes six indexes related to shareholders’ rights in the firm: (1) whether
the company pays (interim and final/annual) dividends in an equitable and timely manner; that is, all
shareholders are treated equally and paid within 30 days after being (i) declared for interim dividends
and (ii) approved by the annual general meeting (AGM) for final dividends; (2) whether shareholders
have the right to participate in amendments to the company’s constitution and the authorization of
additional shares; (3) whether the company provides non-controlling shareholders with the right to
nominate candidates for the BOD/commissioners; (4) whether shareholders have the opportunity,
evidenced by an agenda item, to approve remuneration (fees, allowances, benefits-in-kind, and other
emoluments) or any increases in remuneration for the non-executive directors/commissioners;
(5) whether the company disclosed the voting results, including approving, dissenting, and abstaining
votes for each agenda item, for the most recent AGM; and (6) whether the company’s ordinary or
common shares have one vote for one share.
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3.5. Model specification and variable definitions
We tested the study’s five hypotheses (refer to Section 2.2) using ordered logistic regressions, and
the measurement of the dependent and experimental variables was based mainly on the model
developed by Silveira et al. (2004) and Frank and Sundgren (2012).
IGQS ¼ β0 þ β1DIFFUSEDþ β2PRIVOWNþ β3LnASSETSþ β4ðTD=TAÞ þ β5SGROWTHþ β6PerceivedRISK
þ β7AttitudeRISKþ β8INDUSTþ β9FINSERV þ β10TRADEþ ε
where: IGQS = DISCLOSURE + BOARD + ETHICS + RIGHTS (refer to Section 3.4 for a detailed
discussion).
Notice: 1) the dependent variable IGQS was measured using 20 indicators of equal weight,
which were categorized into four perspectives: disclosure, board characteristics, shareholders’
rights, and code of ethics; 2) the independent variables include new variables PRIVOWN and
SGROWTH in the model, which were not previously considered in the study conducted in
Sweden by Frank and Sundgren (2012), because we supposed that the ownership type and
sales growth of a firm significantly affect its internal governance quality in Ethiopia. However,
our study dropped the variables related to additional issuance of shares, whether the company
business is performed abroad, and whether the company was obliged to follow the code at the
time of the survey submission to enable us to consider the local corporate governance
practices.
We present below the operational definitions of the variables included in the regression model.
3.6. Perspectives of the dependent variable
DISCLOSURE ‒ The “disclosure” dimension was measured based on the four indices indicating
access to information, which take one for presence and zero for absence of the indices. The value
of this dimension ranges from zero to four.
BOARD ‒ The “board” dimension was measured based on the seven indices related to board
characteristics, which take one for presence and zero for absence of the indices. The value of this
dimension ranges from zero to seven.
ETHICS ‒ The “ethics” dimension was measured based on the three indices related to ethics and
conflict of interest, which take one for presence and zero for absence of the indices. The value of
this dimension ranges from zero to three.
RIGHTS ‒ The “rights” dimension was measured based on the six indices related to shareholders’
rights, which take one for presence and zero for absence of the indices. The value of this dimension
ranges from zero to six.
3.7. Independent variables
DIFFUSED ‒ This is a dummy variable taking the value one if no individual shareholder controls
more than 20 per cent of the shares of the company and zero otherwise.
PRIVOWN ‒ This is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the firm is privately owned and
zero otherwise.
LnASSETS ‒ This is the natural logarithm of the total assets (in 2012).
TD/TA—This represents total debt/total assets (in 2012).
SGROWTH ‒ This is the sales growth over the 2008‒2012 period (2012 sales/2008 sales).
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Perceived RISK ‒ On a 5-degree Likert-type scale, the respondent was asked to indicate whether
the company’s risk is higher than that of the average company. One stands for totally disagree and
five stands for totally agree.
Attitude RISK ‒ On a 5-degree Likert-type scale, the respondent was asked whether the com-
pany deliberately invests more in competence and external consultancy to secure its financial
reporting. One stands for totally disagree and five for totally agree.
INDUST ‒ This is a dummy taking the value one for manufacturing companies and zero
otherwise.
FINSERV ‒ This is a dummy taking the value one for companies in the financial sector (excluding
banks) and zero otherwise.
TRADE ‒ This is a dummy taking the value one if the firm is in the trading/services sector and
zero otherwise.
ε = the error term.
4. Results
This study focused on analysing the critical factors that affect the internal governance quality of
corporations in Ethiopia. In this chapter, we present and discuss the results of the study. The
findings of the study generated enough facts to enable the researchers to achieve the objectives
effectively.
4.1. Descriptive statistics
4.1.1. Number of participants by line of business
The number of companies included in the study was 76, as shown below along with the various
types of business (Table 1). Referring to Table 1, 22 industries, 17 financial services, and 37 trading
companies were surveyed in this study.
4.1.2. The dimension of the dependent variable IGQS
The dependent variable in the study was the internal corporate governance quality score (IGQS) of the
sample firms. Table 2 below shows the descriptive statistics of the elements making up the IGQS.
As shown in the table, the mean value of the dependent variable IGQS is 14.39. Its minimum
and maximum values, out of 20, are 4 and 19, respectively. This implies that, though the mean
value is above average, the level of the IGQS of the surveyed corporations is highly divergent,
with a range of 15. The mean value of the IGQS perspectives is as follows: disclosure 3.11,
board 5.19, ethics 1.69, and stakeholders’ rights 5. As can be seen from the table, the board
characteristics of the surveyed corporations are highly fragmented, as the range of the board
perspective is large.
Table 1. Description of surveyed corporations
Distribution of sample by
type of corporation
Frequency of corporations
Absolute Relative
Industry 22 28.9%
Financial Service 17 22.4%
Trade 37 48.7%
Total 76 100.0%
Source: The study findings
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4.1.3. IGQS dimensions by form of ownership
The next table and graph show whether the IGQS dimensions differ for private and government
ownership of the sampled companies. Accordingly, we observed that the mean IGQS value for
public ownership and private ownership is 17 and 13.96, respectively. Even the individual corporate
governance dimensions show a higher value for public firms than private firms. The results indicate
that the internal corporate governance is better in government-owned companies than in private
ones. This finding is consistent with the empirical result of Anthony and Vining (1989), who
reported weak support for the property rights theory of the firm, which proposes that privately
owned companies outperform state-owned ones.
Table 4 compares the mean values of the four perspectives of the IGQS for privately owned and
government-owned corporations. Government-owned corporations scored higher than privately
owned corporations, and the mean difference is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level of
significance. Government-owned corporations performed relatively better on disclosure, code of
ethics, and shareholders’ rights; however, there is no statistically significant mean difference in the
board characteristics of both privately owned and government-owned corporations. Since
the concerns of privately owned and government-owned corporations may not be the same, the
difference in the mean value may be attributed to the existence of free riding in the privately
owned corporations.
4.1.4. Descriptive statistics of the independent variables
Table 5 shows the mean, minimum, and maximum values of the independent variables (test and
control variables) considered in the model. We can see that the average company in the study has
leverage of about 37 per cent; perceives its business as moderately risky (2.3 out of 5); has an
above-average attitude towards risk (3.3 out of 5); and grows annually at about 9.6 per cent.
Furthermore, it can be seen from the table that 58 per cent of the companies have no individual
owner who owns more than 20 per cent of the outstanding shares and 21.4 per cent of the
companies are engaged in financial service provision, mainly insurance services. Besides, around
86 per cent of the surveyed firms are privately owned corporations; the total assets of the
companies extend from 0.87 million birr to 4,070 million birr; the average age of the firms is
21.6 years; and the average board size is 6.
On the other hand, Table 6 shows the Pearson correlation between the independent variables.
Most variables show low to moderate correlation with one exception. The gearing level of the
company, measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets employed, shows quite a high
correlation of 0.75 with the sales growth variable.
4.2. Inferential statistics
In this study we tried to identify the determinants of the internal corporate governance quality of
share companies in Ethiopia. We used an ordinal logistic regression to test the association
between our measure of internal governance quality and the explanatory variables. The results
are discussed below.
Table 2. Description of the dependent variable and its dimensions
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dec. Min Max
IGQS 76 14.39286 3.97596 4 19
Disclosure 76 3.111111 0.83536 2 4
Board 76 5.192308 1.97104 1 7
Ethics 76 1.692308 0.6694 1 3
Rights 76 5 0.84895 3 6
Source: The study findings
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4.2.1. Spearman correlations of the components of the dependent variable IGQS
Table 3 shows the Spearman rank correlations of the components included in the aggregated
dependent variable IGQS. The correlations between DISCLOSURE and the remaining variables is
positive and moderate, indicating that the companies’ behaviour in providing access to firm infor-
mation shows their overall merit when internal governance is concerned. Among the components of
Table 3. Spearman correlation between the IGQS components
IGQS Disclosure Board Ethics Rights
IGQS 1.0000
Disclosure 0.7226 *** 1.0000
Board 0.7718 *** 0.4732 *** 1.0000
Ethics 0.2763*** 0.3141 *** −0.0953 1.0000
Rights 0.6160*** 0.4485*** 0.5443*** −0.0633 1.0000
Notes: * * *p < 0.01, * *p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
Source: The study findings
Table 4. Mean difference of IGQS dimensions by form of ownership
Government-owned
Mean
Privately Owned
Mean
T-Value
Disclosure 3.75 3 3.4827***
Board 5.5 5.14 0.677
Ethics 2 1.64 2.0288**
Rights 5.75 4.88 4.0766***
IGQS 17 13.96 2.93***
Notes: * * *p < 0.01, * *p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Source: The study findings
Table 5. Descriptive statistics of independent variables
Mean Min Max
DIFFUSED 0.5769231 0 1
PRIVOWN 0.8571429 0 1
ASSETS 418,000,000 869,637 4,070,000,000
TD/TA 0.3685 0.941
SGROWTH 0.0964782 −0.008 1.347
PerceivedRISK 2.296296 1 5
AttitudeRISK 3.333333 1 5
FINSERV 0.2142857 0 1
Age 21.55556 1.5 55
Board_size 6.392857 3 21
n = 76
Source: The study findings
Notes: DIFFUSED—a dummy variable taking the value 1 if no individual shareholder controls more than 20 per cent of the
shares of the company, 0 otherwise; PRIVOWN—a dummy which takes a value of 1 if the firm is privately owned and 0 if it is
government-owned; ASSETS—total assets (in 2012); TD/TA—total debt/total assets (in 2012); SGROWTH- sales growth over the
2008–2012 periods; Perceived RISK—5-degree Likert type scale, the respondent was asked to indicate whether the company
risk is higher than the average company, 1 stands for totally disagree and 5 stands for totally agree; Attitude RISK—5-degree
Likert type scale, the respondent was asked whether the company deliberately invests more in competence and external
consultancy to secure the financial reporting, 1 stands for totally disagree and 5 for totally agree; FINSERV—a dummy variable
taking the value 1 if the company is financial service providing (excepting banks) and 0 otherwise; Age- refers to the age of the
firm in business since its establishment; Board size- a variable representing the number of people in the BOD of the firm.
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the dependent variable, the highest correlation (54.43 per cent) occurs between the variables
representing board composition and functioning and shareholder rights in the firms. The table also
reports the correlation between the aggregated IGQS variable and each of the components included
in the score. As expected, all four indicator variables are relatively highly correlated with the
dependent variable.
4.2.2. Overall test of the relationship
The presence of a relationship between the dependent variable and a combination of independent
variables is based on the statistical significance of the chi-square after the independent variables
have been added to the analysis. In this analysis, the model chi-square value is 79.44 with 10 d.f.
and a pseudo-R2 of 52 per cent, which indicate that the model provides a reasonably good
description of the data. Hence, the existence of a relationship between the independent variables
and the dependent variable is supported.
4.2.3. Control variables
The following observations can be made related to the control variables in our regressions. The
Perceived RISK and Attitude RISK variables have positive statistically significant coefficients at the
5 per cent and the 1 per cent significance level, respectively. This shows that a higher level of risks
related to the operation of the company is likely to be associated with higher internal governance
quality. The other control variables are generally insignificant.
We asked the respondents whether they agreed with the statement that “the risks associated
with the operations of their corporation were higher than other similar corporations within the
same industry.” The perceived risk (Perceived RISK) was measured on a Likert scale ranging from
one to five. The variable has a positive and statistically significant coefficient. This indicates that
companies with high perceived risk have higher values of the IGQS.
Companies that have a risk-taking culture might also take greater risks with respect to internal
governance quality. In our study we assumed that the presence of a risk management function
helps to improve the internal governance quality of corporations. Attitudes towards risks were
measured on a 5-grade Likert scale, and the respondents were asked whether they agreed with
the statement that “the culture in their company was to accept relatively high risks” (Attitude
RISK). This variable has a positive and statistically significant coefficient, indicating that the
attitude towards risks in a company is also likely to affect the incentives to invest to improve
the IGQS.
These results are consistent with those of Frank and Sundgren (2012), who reported that larger
companies are more likely to have risk management functions and achieve better corporate
Table 6. Pearson Correlations of the independent variables
DIFFUSED PRIVOWN LnASSETS TD/TA SGROWTH Perceived
RISK
Attitude
RISK
DIFFUSED 1.0000
PRIVOWN −0.3307*** 1.0000
LnASSETS −0.4781*** 0.3689 *** 1.0000
TD/TA −0.4183*** 0.3426*** 0.4193*** 1.0000
SGROWTH −0.5578*** 0.4216*** 0.5632*** 0.7474*** 1.0000
PerceivedRISK −0.0419 0.0970 0.1015 −0.0341 0.0286 1.0000
AttitudeRISK 0.0916 0.0404 0.0600 −0.1882 −0.1282 −0.1946 1.0000
Notes: ***p < 0.01
LnASSETS—the natural logarithm of total assets (in 2012);
Source: The study findings
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governance. This is because the higher the level of risk management attitudes in a firm’s BOD, the
greater the demand for good corporate governance in general. Thinking about risk helps to
manage the risks that face the internal governance of a corporation. Corporations normally realize
that commitment to strengthening risk management functions helps them to develop appropriate
controls and prevent questionable and fraudulent practices (COSO, 1992; Desender & Lafuente,
2007). Although the empirical support is generally insignificant, the age of the firm and the
number of people on the board of a corporation are negatively associated with the dependent
variable, the IGQS.
4.3. Results of the hypothesis tests
Five test variables and five control variables were considered in the model. Of these, four test
variables and two control variables were found to be significant at least at the 10 per cent
significance level. The significant test variables include PRIVOWN (the form of ownership: private
or government), corporate size (expressed in terms of Lnasset), leverage (the ratio of total debt to
total asset), and sales growth; the significant control variables are perceived risk and attitude
towards risk. On the contrary, DIFFUSED is statistically insignificant. Apart from corporate size and
sales growth, the directions or signs of the test variables do not agree with the hypothesis. The
most significant IGQS determinants are sales growth and attitude towards risk, with a p-value of at
most 0.01.
DIFFUSED was used to test our H1. It can be seen from Table 7 that the measure has a negative
sign, although a positive sign was expected. The coefficient, however, is not significant at the 0.10
level (two-tailed tests) when the model is estimated. The finding shows that, among the sample
companies in Ethiopia, those with more dispersed ownership have undertaken more actions that
arguably improve the internal governance quality. Thus, the empirical result rejects the hypothesis
that there is a direct association between diffused ownership and internal governance quality.
H2 was developed to determine whether there is difference in the internal governance quality
of privately owned and governmental corporations. PRIVOWN is the empirical measure and the
coefficient has a negative and statistically significant value, whereas government-owned com-
panies are likely to have a better internal governance quality than privately owned companies.
Table 7. Ordinal logistic regressions of internal corporate governance quality on test and
control variables
Coef. Std. Err. z
DIFFUSED −1.149719 1.080748 −1.06
PRIVOWN −4.776149** 1.966943 −2.43
LnASSETS 0.0000000028** 1.15E-09 2.44
TD/TA -−6.853075** 3.073636 −2.23
SGROWTH 0.1878591*** 0.0696236 2.7
PerceivedRISK 1.77071** 0.7407129 2.39
AttitudeRISK 1.1965*** 0.3906017 3.06
FINSERV 19.69551 1292.34 0.02
Age −0.0743033 0.0685732 −1.08
Board size −0.0667611 0.1873393 −0.36
Log likelihood −42.323289
LR chi2(10) 79.44
Pseudo-R2
Number of obs
0.52
76
Notes: * * *p < 0.01, * *p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
Source: The study findings
Adane et al., Cogent Economics & Finance (2018), 6: 1537051
https://doi.org/10.1080/23322039.2018.1537051
Page 13 of 17
Thus, the result does not provide empirical support for H2, which stated that there is no
difference between governmental and private ownership in internal governance quality. This
could be due to several reasons: for instance, the government is not the ultimate owner but an
agent of the ultimate owners, so the incentives of the government may deviate from those of
the owner, and the government as the owner faces many conflicts of interest and is concerned
about other factors, such as employment (Claessens et al., 2000). Thus, considering the defi-
ciency of clearly defined rules and regulations and regulatory institutions to govern the acts of
corporations, privately owned corporations may try to free ride without fair investment in
internal governance quality.
H3 proposed a positive association between corporate size and internal governance quality. The
empirical result, as shown in Table 7, shows that the coefficient of LnASSETS is positive and
significant at the 0.05 level. These results show that larger companies have higher IGQS values.
H4 focused on the association between leverage and internal governance quality. It can be seen
from Table 7 that the coefficient of TD/TA is negative and significant at the 0.01 level in the two-
tailed tests in the regression. The sign of the coefficient, however, does not agree with the
hypothesis. However, an alternative explanation that we cannot rule out is that lenders have a
substitution role with respect to governance characteristics.
H5 referred to the relationship between the sales growth of a firm and its internal governance
quality. Specifically, it proposed that there is a positive association between a firm’s sales growth and
its internal governance quality. According to Table 7 above, the coefficient of the sales growth variable,
SGROWTH, is positive and significant at the 0.01 level in the two-tailed tests in the regression model.
This result implies that firms need to secure a high degree of internal controls and consequently
achieve a high IGQS to remain in business and grow their sales volume and dollars over the years.
5. Discussion and conclusions
Due to various phenomena, such as the business scandals and financial crises that have occurred in
several parts of the business world, corporate governance is attracting the attention of researchers,
policy makers, and even politicians. This section deals with the key findings regarding the factors that
determine the internal corporate governance quality of Ethiopian corporations and their implication. A
combination of 20 indicators was identified as a measure of the outcome variable (internal corporate
governance quality), as used by Silveira et al. (2004) and Frank and Sundgren (2012). These indicators
were categorized into 4 perspectives: disclosure, board, shareholders’ right, and code of ethics (Carol,
2002). The outcome variable was then regressed using ordered logistics against explanatory variables:
ownership concentration, type of ownership (government or privately owned), corporate size, lever-
age, sales growth, perceived risk, attitude towards risk, type of business, board size, and age. To test
the hypotheses, 76 companies were surveyed. Of the 10 explanatory variables included in the model,
the type of ownership (government or privately owned), firm size, leverage, sales growth, perceived
risk, and attitude towards risk were found to be statistically significant at the 5 per cent level.
According to the result, the trend of the AC for publicly traded companies, in many developed and
emerging countries is from non-existence to voluntarily and now is being mandatory (Bhasin, 2012).
Similarly, previous study by Forker (1992), Ho andWong (2001) in Hong Kong evidenced that companies
with AC are more likely to enhance good corporate governance than those with no AC. The ownership
structure affects other elements of corporate governance. According to the result, controlling share-
holders have a strong incentive to monitor the management of firms and can be the most important
part of corporate governance. Similarly, existing theories and empirical studies that analyse ownership
structure in Sweden generally identify that block shareholders spend more time, effort and expense to
monitor the firm closely due to their large stakes (Frank & Sundgren, 2012).
The essential implications of this study are described in the following. The quality of internal
governance of government-owned companies is likely to be relatively better than that of privately
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held companies. This result contradicts the hypothesis that there is no difference between govern-
mental and privately owned corporations regarding internal governance quality. It implies that the
internal governance quality of privately held companies falls below that of government-owned
corporations. The result is inconsistent with previous studies such as Lemmon and Lins (2003) who
argued that the ownership structure (diffused) in eight East Asian countries is a determinant factor
for corporate governance. This suggests a need for intervention by appropriate authorities and
officials to strengthen the corporate governance system of privately owned corporations, to enable
the internal governance quality of the two groups of corporations to converge, and to increase the
quality to the highest level possible. Thus, due to the lack of clearly defined rules and regulations
and regulatory institutions to govern corporations’ actions, privately owned corporations may try
to free ride without fair investment in internal governance quality.
Firm size and sales growth have a positive impact on the quality of internal governance. This result is
consistent with the hypothesis stating that the internal governance quality directly correlates with the
firm size and sales growth. The relatively complicated structure of larger corporations and corpora-
tions with high sales growth requires well-defined and functional corporate governance. This result is
consistent with Frank and Sundgren (2012) who found a significant positive relationship between
corporate size and IGQS. Althoughdirection of the relationship is not clear, Adams (2002) also reported
that corporate size is an important variable to determine the level of disclosure which is one the
perspective of IGQS in this study. This relationship could be because governance mechanisms con-
sume corporate resources and larger firms would have better capacity to invest and ensure good
corporate governance quality.
However, in the case of leverage, the study result shows a negative correlation between leverage
and internal governance quality. This result contradicts the hypothesis that proposes a positive
association between leverage and internal governance quality. In general, a higher debt ratio
indicates a larger amount of interests and principals to be paid periodically, and the management
would be under pressure to ensure sufficient cash to cover the periodic payments; this in turn can
be ensured through efficient internal governance. Moreover, regarding the ownership structure,
the direction of the relationship between the IGQS and the variable DIFFUSED is not as predicted,
and the association is not statistically significant.
This research adds to the existing body of literature by investigating and analysing the deter-
mining factors of internal corporate governance quality. Moreover, it can improve stakeholders’
understanding on the determinants of internal corporate governance quality in private and pub-
licly held corporations in Ethiopia.
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